Suriname signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) on March 29, 1996, and ratified it on March 27, 2002. It is a State Party to the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) since June 4, 2002. Accordingly, Suriname has undergone five rounds of review under MESICIC.

Suriname’s record in implementing its commitments to UNCAC exhibits a large number of failures and no successes. With an overall score of 31.7, the measures adopted place the country towards the bottom level of compliance with international norms, second only to Saint Lucia (30.9) and behind Dominica (38.4) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (46.7). While implementation efforts may be said to be well distributed among the three sections—although leaning towards criminalization and international cooperation rather than prevention, as is the case throughout the region—the lack of meaningful progress on any preventive measure and the unimplemented state of almost half of all measures related to international cooperation reflect the general deficit of anti-corruption efforts in the country.

The prevention of corruption is mostly lacking, classified as “core-deficient” by its average score and with only two measure reaching a score above 30—the enforcement of standards of conduct (43.0) and the elimination of favorable tax treatment for corrupt expenditure (43.8). The country has not implemented systems for registering asset and conflict of interests' declarations. Concerning these, MESICIC reports in its first round of review that “there are no provisions in force which require the filing of statutory declarations of income, assets and liabilities”, a matter that remained unaddressed by the fourth round of review. Above this measure, the country also shows a deficient implementation of its commitments concerning the state of oversight bodies (102.2), the training of public officials (14.8), transparency in government contracting (14.8), initiatives to encourage the participation of civil society (28.9), and others.

In terms of criminalization and law enforcement, Suriname also shows poor results, with roughly two thirds of all measures within this section classified as core-deficient or unimplemented. The criminalization of active bribery of foreign officials and illicit enrichment remain fully unimplemented, while three measures are found deficient at core—the protection of those who report acts of corruption (i.e., whistleblower protection), and the criminalization of active and passive bribery in the public sector. Regarding whistleblower protection in Suriname, MESICIC reports in its second round of review that “there is no specific legislation related to systems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption.” Following up on this issue, the report of the fifth round (adopted in 2018) acknowledges some progress but finds that the country remains deficient: “[t]he lack of active monitoring and absence of whistleblower law which enable people to report misbehaviors of civil servants without fear for repercussions are major weaknesses.” On the other hand, some degree of progress is found concerning the criminalization of the abuse of functions (47.7), extended forms of involvement in the commission of corruption offenses such as participation and attempt (47.7), and money laundering (57.8).

Suriname’s efforts in promoting and engaging with international cooperation are also considered to be largely lacking, receiving an average section score of 39.5 and a “core-deficient” classification. The most prominent issue in this section is the total lack of efforts to support extradition. The report of the third round of review of MESICIC (adopted in 2011) finds that “[w]hile Articles 10 and 11 of the Extradition Act can serve as a legal basis to grant extradition to those countries with which [Suriname] has an extradition treaty, the Committee notes that Suriname does not have extradition treaties with any of the OAS Member States. As such, it leaves out the States Parties to the Convention and thus in those cases, there is no legal basis to be found in the country under review to grant an extradition request.” The situation is aggravated by the fact that “the Extradition Act does not establish the obligation of the country under review to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution when a request for extradition… is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, or because the Requested State deems that it has jurisdiction over the offense, and neither is there a requirement to report the final outcome to [the] Requesting State.”