Chile signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) on March 29, 1996, and ratified it on September 22, 1998. It is a State Party to the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) since June 4, 2001. The country also signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on December 11, 2003, and subsequently ratified it on September 13, 2006. Chile is also party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD-ABC), having signed it on December 17, 1997, and deposited the instrument of ratification on April 18, 2001. Accordingly, Chile has undergone five rounds of review under MESICIC, one round of review under the UNCAC review mechanism, and four phases of evaluation by the OECD Working Group on Bribery. 

Chile’s record in implementing its commitments to IACAC, UNCAC, and OECD-ABC exhibits a number of successes and very few failures. With an overall score of 70.5, the measures adopted place the country at the higher point of compliance with international norms, surrounded by Mexico (69.7), Brazil (69.8), Peru (72.3), and Colombia (74.2). Despite achieving higher success in regard to criminalization and international cooperation (as is the case throughout the region) the large majority of preventive measures are found to be in progress or implemented; furthermore, contrary to the regional pattern, Chile evidences higher performance in the implementation of measures pertaining to criminalization and law enforcement rather than international cooperation.

The prevention of corruption is undergoing, classified as “in progress” by its average score and with prominent measures given a score above 50—standards of conduct and their enforcement, the state of oversight bodies, and encouraging the participation of civil society, among others. Indeed, almost three quarters of all preventive measures are considered to be in progress, and the training of public officials in the country is considered to be implemented, even if mildly (74.2). Within this section, only two measures fall far from the target range—transparency in government contracting and the actions to deter domestic and foreign bribery related to accounting regulations—both of which receive a score of 43.8. These measures represent one third of all “core-deficient” scores given to Chile’s implementation of international commitments, again reflecting the generally satisfactory distribution of progress.

In terms of criminalization of acts of corruption and related offenses, Chile shows mostly satisfactory results. The country is found to have successfully implemented several key commitments set out by the three conventions, criminalizing and enforcing the illicit acquisition of a benefit (i.e., influence trading), embezzlement in the public and private sectors, the obstruction of justice, as well as providing a long statute of limitations and broader consequences—such as the rescinding of contracts and obtaining compensation—for the commitment of corrupt offenses (as required by UNCAC), among others. Furthermore, most measures that are evaluated as remaining in progress—with actions against the active bribery of foreign officials (50.0) and the liability of legal persons (57.8) being exceptions here—received promising scores and are mostly penalized. However, there is a lack of sufficient information to allow for a comprehensive assessment. The measures thus affected include key commitments such those pertaining to active and passive bribery in the public sector, the abuse of functions, money laundering, and bribery in the private sector. While these results and the average section score reflect the fact that Chile can be said to have largely implemented its commitments to the criminalization of corruption, a single issue remains—the criminalization of illicit enrichment, a commitment to which the country’s efforts are still considered deficient for the aims of the conventions.

Chile is found fully compliant in its commitments to establish jurisdiction over the offenses covered by the conventions, including those that have been committed inside its territory, committed by a national, or when the offender is present in its territory, among other required forms. The country’s ongoing efforts to implement its commitments regarding international cooperation is reflected in less than half of all measures within this section receiving an “implemented” score of various degrees. However, only one measure remains deficient or unimplemented: the regulation and application of special investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance, undercover operations, and others.