

# Honduras

Western Hemisphere / **Central America**

<b>CAPITAL</b> Tegucigalpa	<b>TERRITORY</b> 111,890 km <sup>2</sup>	<b>POPULATION (2020)</b> 9,904,608.00	<b>GDP TOTAL (2020)</b> \$23.83B USD	<b>GDP PER CAPITA (2020)</b> \$2,405.73 USD	<b>INCOME GROUP</b> Lower middle income
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## Convention Implementation



In progress

13<sup>th</sup> of 31 western hemisphere  
5<sup>th</sup> of 8 Central American countries

### Prevention



In progress

### Criminalization and law enforcement




In progress


### International cooperation



Implemented



## Anti-corruption conventions timeline



### CONVENTIONS

- IACAC - Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
- UNCAC - United Nations Convention against Corruption
- OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

### KEY EVENTS

- Signed
- Ratified/acceded
- Review rounds

## Prevention

In progress

# 52.3

✓ Adoption 82.5    ✎ Design 63.3    ⌚ Enforcement 65.0

<b>Standards of Conduct</b> In progress <b>62.5</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Enforcement of Standards of Conduct</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Training of Public Officials</b> No implementation <b>7.8</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 0.0 ⌚ 50.0	<b>Asset and Conflicts of Interests Declarations</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Transparency in Government Contracting</b> Core-deficient <b>26.6</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 33.3
<b>Elimination of Favorable Tax Treatment</b> Implemented <b>100.0</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Oversight Bodies</b> Core-deficient <b>21.9</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 33.3	<b>Measures to Deter Domestic and Foreign Bribery</b> Implemented <b>100.0</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Encouraging Participation by Civil Society</b> Core-deficient <b>33.6</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 50.0	<b>Study of Other Preventive Measures</b> Core-deficient <b>26.6</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 33.3 ⌚ 50.0

## Criminalization and law enforcement

In progress

# 64.6

✓ Adoption 80.0    ✎ Design 66.0    ⌚ Enforcement 89.3

<b>Protection of Those who Report Acts of Corruption</b> In progress <b>62.5</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 83.3	<b>Scope</b> Implemented <b>100.0</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Jurisdiction: Offense-in-Territory</b> In progress <b>68.8</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Jurisdiction: Offense-by-National</b> Core-deficient <b>35.9</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 33.3 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Jurisdiction: Offender-in-Territory</b> In progress <b>50.0</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 100.0
<b>Passive Public Bribery</b> In progress <b>50.0</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Active Public Bribery</b> In progress <b>62.5</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Abuse of Functions</b> In progress <b>62.5</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Money Laundering</b> Core-deficient <b>40.6</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 66.7	<b>Participation and Attempt</b> Implemented <b>82.8</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 100.0
<b>Active Foreign Bribery</b> Implemented <b>100.0</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Illicit Enrichment</b> Implemented <b>85.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Use of State Property</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Illicit Acquisition of a Benefit</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Public Embezzlement</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0
<b>Passive Foreign Bribery</b> No implementation <b>0.0</b> ✓ 0.0 ✎ 0.0 ⌚ 0.0	<b>Private Bribery</b> Core-deficient <b>21.9</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 16.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Private Embezzlement</b> In progress <b>68.8</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Obstruction of Justice</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Liability of Legal Persons</b> In progress <b>71.9</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 66.7 ⌚ 100.0
<b>Statute of Limitations</b> Implemented <b>100.0</b> ✓ 100.0 ✎ 100.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Prosecution, Adjudication and Sanctions</b> Implemented <b>82.8</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Consequences and Compensation</b> In progress <b>50.0</b> ✓ 50.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Cooperation With Law Enforcement</b> Implemented <b>82.8</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 83.3 ⌚ 100.0	<b>Asset Recovery</b> In progress <b>47.7</b> ✓ 75.0 ✎ 50.0 ⌚ 83.3

# International cooperation

Implemented

## 79.4

✓ Adoption 86.7   ✎ Design 92.2   ⌚ Enforcement 84.4




# Corruption Resilience

## 42.1

Vulnerable

26<sup>th</sup> of 31 western hemisphere  
6<sup>th</sup> of 8 Central American countries



# Analysis

## Convention Implementation

Honduras signed the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) on March 29, 1996, and ratified it on May 25, 1998. It is a State Party to the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) since December 8, 2001. The country also signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on May 17, 2004, and subsequently ratified it on May 23, 2005. Accordingly, Honduras has undergone four rounds of review (Honduras was suspended from OAS between 2009 and 2011 and did not take part in the third round of review) under MESICIC, and one round of review under the UNCAC review mechanism.

Honduras's record in implementing its commitments to IACAC and UNCAC exhibits a number of successes and a few failures. With an overall score of 66.6, the measures adopted place the country squarely at the middle point of compliance with international norms, surrounded by Ecuador (65.1), Uruguay (66.1), The Bahamas (67.1), and Guatemala (67.2). However, progress in implementation is somewhat unequally distributed. While the country evidences only a gradual increase in the rate of success from one section of measures to the other, over half of all deficient and unimplemented measures are found in regard to prevention. That being said, all but one measures below the "implemented" level receive a score of 50 or above—a degree of progress that reflects the overall state of the country's performance.

The prevention of corruption is undergoing, classified as "in progress" by its average score but with substantial differences across the section, with half of all measures found to be deficient or unimplemented. The deficient measures are the state of oversight bodies (21.9), transparency in government contracting (26.6), the study of preventive measures related to equitable compensation (26.6), and the initiatives to encourage the participation of civil society (33.6). The training of public officials receives a score of 7.8 and is considered to be unimplemented. In this respect, the Honduran Prosecutors' Association informed during the fifth round of MESICIC that "[t] here is no structured system in the country that provides for and ensures the proper training of employees of public institutions." It is also reported that "Honduras does not have a body that is dedicated to the training of public employees" and that challenges arise from "a lack of funding, human resources, and the necessary infrastructure to meet the training needs of all of the employees of the central government." On the other hand, two measures are found to be fully implemented—the actions to deter domestic

and foreign bribery related to accounting regulations, and the elimination of favorable tax treatment for corrupt expenditure.

In terms of criminalization and law enforcement, Honduras shows better results than those regarding prevention, with almost two thirds of all measures within this section are found in progress. Indeed, a number of significant measures receive a score above 60—the criminalization of active bribery in the public sector, abuse of functions, the illicit acquisition of a benefit (i.e., influence trading), public embezzlement, and obstruction of justice. Furthermore, two important measures required by UNCAC also receive positive scores: the liability of legal persons and the criminalization of embezzlement in the private sector (both with a score of 71.9)—although the criminalization of bribery in the private sector and passive bribery of foreign officials, also required by UNCAC, are found deficient and fully unimplemented, respectively. The country's efforts pertaining to money laundering are also considered to be deficient.

Finally, Honduras's mild implementation of its commitments regarding international cooperation is reflected in almost two thirds of all measures within this section receiving an "implemented" score and no measures found deficient at core or unimplemented.

## Corruption Resilience

Honduras's 2020 social context indicator increased by 0.2 points from the previous year, resulting in a score of 45.3, which fails to meet the regional average of 64.9 by 19.6 points and falls within the bottom percentile for the Western Hemisphere. The country's performance across the subregion was poor, where it received one of the lowest ranks (7/8), followed by Nicaragua. Throughout the decade, the mini-max range for Honduras was 42.5 (2011/2012) and 52.7 (2014), with a range of 10.2 points. Honduras's social context indicator was attributed to the dramatically poor status of civil liberties and political rights throughout the country. While constitutional guarantees 'protect' press freedom, journalists are frequently subject to harassment, intimidation, and death threats. According to Reports Without Borders, following the 2009 coup d'état, the government has consistently targeted the media.

With regard to the quality of governance and institutions, the country's score decreased by 3 points from the previous year, resulting in a score of 36.5. Honduras's indicator score is substantially low and falls below the Western Hemisphere regional average of 50.6 by 14.1 points. Since 2010, the

country's score has steadily declined, wherein 2010, the country's score was 45.1, 8.6 points dropped between 2010 and 2020. The country's quality of government score is attributed to widespread and worsening corruption within the country, the government's lack of control over corruption, and weak-performing democracy. The country is characterized by democratic fragility.

Honduras's rule of law indicator declined in 2020 by 3.8 points from the previous year. The indicator's Western Hemisphere regional 2020 average was 51.1, and Honduras's score was 19.5 points below the regional average. Honduras's rule of law indicator falls within the bottom percentile for the Western Hemisphere region. Over the last decade, the mini-max range for Honduras was 31.6 (2020) and 41.1 (2011), with a range of 9.5 points. Honduras's 2020 rule of law indicator was primarily impacted by the lack of judicial independence and impartiality, which remains susceptible to the influence of powerful political and business elites.

In terms of Honduras's business stability score, the country's indicator increased by 0.5 points from the previous year but continues to fall below the

regional average of 50.5 for 2020. Throughout the decade, the country's indicator score has varied, where its highest score was achieved in 2017 with 59.5, and its lowest score was in 2015 with 44.0. Honduras's business stability indicator is primarily influenced by the lack of efficiency in regulations and widespread corruption.

The country's violence and security indicator for 2020 increased by 8.4 points from the previous year, resulting in a score of 48.5. Of all the previous indicators, Honduras's violence and security score has improved the most dramatically. Despite this improvement, Honduras's score fails to meet the Western Hemisphere average of 55.0 by 6.5 points. Throughout the last decade, the mini-max range for Honduras was 33.5 (2014) and 48.5 (2020), with a range of 14.95 points. While the country has experienced slight improvements in its score, it consistently ranks below its subregional counterparts. Honduras's violence and security indicator score for 2020 was primarily influenced by the country's unprecedented homicide rate and the widespread presence of criminal gangs.